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Abstract 
Gazprom, Russian's prime state owned gas producer, is facing severe pressure stemming from 
international gas market dynamics, EU regulation and the Ukraine crisis. Slowing gas demand coupled 
with shifting pricing models and a persisting transit issue pose significant challenges for Gazprom's 
business going forward. Domestic pressure emerges from competition arising from private companies, 
mainly Notatek, but also state owned rival Rosneft, and is reinforced by governmental moves toward 
more market oriented Russian gas sector organization. Gazprom's options include pivoting to 
alternative markets, notably China; reverting to international legal bodies and market principles to 
counter EU regulatory pressures; and to depoliticize gas trade in order to generate long term 
expectations on its prime market - Europe. We pose that neither of these options is likely to fully solve 
Gazprom's dilemma, whose competitive position will arguably further weaken both domestically and 
internationally. We believe that Gazprom's best option would be to aim for depoliticizing gas trade, by 
way of giving up its de facto monopoly on gas exports to Europe. 
Keywords 
Energy security, gas markets, Gazprom, European Union, regulation 
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1. Introduction: Gazprom's perfect storm* 
Increasing tensions between the EU and Russia, declining world oil prices and accelerating dynamics 
in transnational gas markets have put severe pressure on Gazprom, Russia's prime state owned 
company and the world's largest gas producer. Gazprom's production levels fell by 5 % in 2014, to a 
long-time low of 430 bcm a year
1
. Export dynamics also slowed down, and have been especially weak 
in the second part of the year 2014 and early 2015
2
. Observers therefore estimate a drop of 60% in 
year-on-year net profits in the last quarter of 2014
3
. 
Figure 1: Gas Exports to Europe, 2010-14, bcm 
 
Source: Gazprom Export and East European Gas Portal 
  
                                                     
*
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For details on most recent trends in gas supplies from Russia to European states, see J. Stern, S. Pirani and K. Yafimava, 
Does the cancellation of South Stream signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian gas export policy?, Comment of 
Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, January 2015, available on URL: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Does-cancellation-of-South-Stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-Russian-gas-export-
policy-GPC-5.pdf (last accessed 5 February 2015)  
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For details, see Platts data, 22 January 2015, available on http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/london/analysis-
russias-jan-gas-flow-to-west-europe-26989784 (last accessed on 5 February 2015) 
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World Street Journal, 29 January 2015, available on http://www.wsj.com/articles/gazprom-profit-falls-on-ruble-ukraine-
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Figure 2: Gas exports to Europe, 2013-14, bcm 
 
 
 
Arguably, a warm winter season had its share in faltering sales. Yet, the main reason lies in Gazprom 
is facing important challenges in Europe and in Ukraine. What is more, Gazprom also increasingly has 
to deal with competition in its home market, arising from Russian gas producers gaining strength. 
Finally, the Ukraine crisis keeps on impeding the company’s operations and impacts on its options. 
Among others, the crisis pushed Gazprom to make stronger commitments to the Asian market, where 
China increasingly gains market power. Taken together, these trends pose significant challenges for 
Gazprom's business going forward. In fact, if unchecked, they may amount to a perfect storm for the 
gas major. 
It would be easy to discard Gazprom's dilemma as a domestic Russian affair. Yet, analyzing 
Gazprom’s perspective in the international gas conundrum is of high relevance for European 
consumers and its gas industry. Indeed, Gazprom, holding Russia’s export monopoly, supplies about 
30% of the EU’s gas consumption and the share is as high as 100% in some countries of Central 
Eastern Europe. There, is a persisting lack of cross-border interconnections that makes Russia a crucial 
player. Obviously, interconnections are being constructed but a declining demand and a lack of 
competition rather makes these investments doubtful. In this context, Gazprom's gas remains one of 
the most competitive gas suppliers in Europe, not the least because the pipeline infrastructure, put in 
place by the Soviet Union at the time, has been amortised. As we will demonstrate here, Euro-Russian 
divergences rather stem from institutional and political dimensions. Gazprom therefore plays a pivotal 
role in European markets and their energy infrastructure, including its asset swap agreements with the 
largest European gas undertakings (eg, Italian Eni, French Gaz de France, German Eon), its 
participation and leadership in large-scale pipeline projects such as Nord Stream, and its direct 
involvement in gas trading via Gazprom International Operating and Trading Ltd and Gazprom 
Germania GmbH
4
. Besides, the Russian gas major invested in the power sector in some European 
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states and even entered the electricity trading business through acquiring Germany's Envacom
5
. 
Understanding Gazprom's options and assessing its strategies therefore becomes imperative for 
European energy security going forward. Last but not least, Gazprom's corporate debt to international 
banks - and particularly the European financial sector - exceeds 300 bln USD, hence its economic 
interests and strategies cannot be ignored.  
This policy brief highlights the key challenges Gazprom has come to face at both international and 
domestic levels. It assesses Gazprom's options in this context and poses that neither strategy - pivoting 
to China, fighting EU regulatory pressures and (so far unconvincing) attempts to depoliticize European 
gas trade - will offer a silver bullet to Gazprom's woes. Gazprom’s strategy reflects a complex 
combination between contradicting institutional features, which combines protecting its monopoly 
structures on one hand and adapting to changing market dynamics on the other. The objective of this 
brief is to sketch Gazprom's situation and to assess possible policy options the company could purse.  
2. Shifting market fundamentals: from shortfall to oversupply 
European gas markets, the largest and most profitable in Gazprom’s customer portfolio, have been in 
deep transition towards more competitive structures by at the same time being experiencing over-
supply and a declining demand. In the early 2000s most of the European gas importing utilities 
expected a projected gas supply deficit while at the same time European gas demand was expected to 
rise
6
. Keen on closing the perceived gap and eager to secure supplies in a growing market, large gas 
companies from Germany, France and Italy hurried to conclude long term contracts (LTCs) with 
Gazprom by allocating to the latter new long term guarantees of gas purchase and sweetened by 
granting access to downstream. Gazprom struck long term deals with Eni, Gaz de France and Eon 
Ruhrgas on supplies up to 2030-35, which include the opportunity for Gazprom to directly sell small 
quantities to the respective downstream markets in Italy, France and Germany. In addition Gazprom 
engaged in an asset swap agreement with Germany's chemical giant BASF, which owns gas trader 
Wintershall
7
.  
The preference of European gas companies for long term agreements with Gazprom changed
8
 as 
the market started to shift by the end of the decade, which was triggered by soaring LNG inflows into 
Europe and sluggish demand in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, and resulted in a surplus in 
gas supplies
9
.  
  
                                                     
5
 Itar Tass, 15.11.2012, http://itar-tass.com/en/archive/664529 (last accessed on 5 February 2015) 
6
 Among others, in 1999 Finnish company Fortum was forecasting a gas deficit of about 100 bcm per annum for the period 
starting from 2015, see Fortum, Northern Dimension Gas Study, Helsinki, 1999 
7
 For more detailed overview of Gazprom’s long term contracts in Europe see J. Stern, “The Impact of European 
Regulation and Policy on Russian Gas Exports and Pipelines”, in J. Henderson and S. Pirani, The Russian Gas Matrix: 
How Markets are Driving Change, Oxford: University Press, 2014, pp. 82-107 
8
 Among others, in 1999 Finnish company Fortum was forecasting a gas deficit of about 100 bcm per annum for the period 
starting from 2015, see Fortum, Northern Dimension Gas Study, Helsinki, 1999 
9
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Figure 3: EU gas demand trends 
 
 
Moreover, available short term supplies of natural gas stimulated transactions and churn on natural gas 
hubs in Europe, making the price gradually decouple from oil. Bilateral contracts with Gazprom, by 
contrast, mostly kept the indexation. Between 2011 and 2014, therefore, the oil-indexed price at times 
was some $2 per MBTU higher than hub traded prices.
10
 The difference gave rise to serious 
disagreements between the Gazprom and European companies over the pricing formula for long term 
Russian imports. Declining demand made European companies take off less gas than agreed in the 
LTCs. What is more, companies started to buffer short term (i.e. daily or monthly) demand hikes by 
additional purchases on gas hubs. Gazprom criticized this growing re-orientation toward hub-based 
pricing and, especially, short term transactions for creating strong uncertainty for upstream 
investments with long pay back periods of 10-20 years. They argued that whilst the suppliers kept 
their responsibility in providing the commodity, consumers profited from a switch to lower prices, 
effectively breaching long term agreements. Yet, producers would still need to commit to long term 
financial obligations (i.e. bank loans), commitments which were concluded in advance and on the 
basis of existing contractual terms pertaining to price and volumes.
11 
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For the gas price comparison, see International Energy Agency, available at URL: 
http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/graphics/2014-11-04-will-asian-gas-prices-come-down-from-their-heights.html 
(last accessed on 4 February 2015)  
11 
See a more detailed comment on the European norms for Access to capacities and subsequent considerations by Russian 
experts by V. Feigin and A. Konoplyanik, Comments on Capacity Allocation on European Gas Transmission Networks 
Pilot Framework Guideline (Ref: E09-GNM-10-05, 10 December 2009); A. Konoplyanik, “A Common Russia-EU 
Energy Space (The New EU-Russia Partnership Agreement, Acquis Communautaire, the Energy Charter and the New 
Russian Initiative)” in K. Talus, P-L- Fratini, EU-Russia Energy Relations,Brussels: Euroconfidentiel, 2010 
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Figure 4: Oil and Gas price dynamics in Europe 
 
Source: East European Gas (adapted), 2015 
Arguably, however, the recent decline in oil prices may contributes to making the gas price issue less 
politicized: Gazprom’s price curve will follow oil, due to an oil indexation that still pertains to around 
50 percent of the gas imported from Russia. A softening oil market will exert its impact on gas prices 
with the typical time lag of about half a year. The difference between oil indexed and gas hub prices 
might therefore diminish in the long run, and European energy retail companies might therefore 
become less attracted by hub-based pricing, whereas Gazprom may become less keen on maintaining 
the oil indexation. 
3. EU legal frameworks: increasing competitive pressure 
Adding to Gazprom's woes, European competition policy has an increasing impact on the company's 
long lasting business practices. In addition, during the first decade of 2000s, transit flows were then 
exempted from the EU liberalization scheme. In many central and eastern EU states, Gazprom did 
either have shares in transmission operators or concluded agreements where 100% of gas transpo 
rt capacity has been booked for the Russian supplier. Gazprom typically reserved all of its transit 
capacity to fulfil its gas supply agreements. This has been justified by the need to respond to the 
demand volatility. However, the EU's Third Energy Package of 2009 and particularly its Regulation 
715/2009 and subsequent Network Code for Capacity Allocation Mechanisms introduced a number of 
provisions aimed at enhancing market practices in pipeline use, which also apply to transit contracts. 
In particular, the Package opposes the booking of transport capacity without actual using it
12
. What is 
more, whilst during the first decade of 2000s transit flows were then exempted from the EU 
liberalization scheme, this came to an end as well. 
In the context of a new gas over-supply, the change in EU legal frameworks meant significant risks 
for Gazprom's operations. According to the new European regulation on pipeline capacity, 
                                                     
12 
For more details on the EU gas market regulation and functioning, including access to networks and charges mechanisms, 
see M. Hallack, „Opening a Market for Gas Flexibility“ in J-M. Glachant, M. Hallack, M. Vazquez, Building Competitive 
Gas Markets in the EU, Edward Elgar, 2013, pp. 77-110.  
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Transmission System Operators (TSOs) have to open networks for both daily and hourly exchanges
13. 
Hence, Gazprom would enter competition with other suppliers without the ability to reserve an entire 
pipeline capacity as it used to be done before. Gazprom’s concerns regarding Third Party Access 
(TPA) has mainly been related to short term transport capacity agreements, which do not reflect long 
term supply obligations. Gazprom therefore argues that this will lead to a 'supply-capacity mismatch' 
between supplies committed in a long term contract and available pipeline capacity. According to 
European legal practice, the capacity reservation for long term supplies by a dominant player should 
not exceed 50 percent. Gazprom as well as some European companies considered this an inadequate 
measure to ensure imports and investments
14
. Noteworthy, similar concerns related to the necessity to 
match supply contracts with transport capacity were mentioned during negotiations of the Transit 
Protocol of the Energy Charter Treaty. At the time Russia, certainly influenced by Gazprom's interests, 
requested the right of first refusal for existing supply contracts ensuring capacity agreements.
15
  
In addition, the EU Network Codes on Capacity Access Mechanisms do not address the issue of 
new infrastructure development, which remains a crucial concern for any large gas company, 
including Gazprom. At various discussion fora, including the EU-Russia Gas Advisory Council, 
Russian experts advocated for a need of stable long-term capacity access mechanisms as incentives to 
invest into new infrastructures.
16
 Among others, Andrey Konoplyanik, advisor to Gazprom Export, 
argues that auctions are not suitable for putting in place new infrastructure capacity because of the 
high capital costs entailed and related investor uncertainty. Instead, he says, new infrastructure 
capacity should reflect the financial capabilities of investors, be organized through Open Season and 
revert to auctioning only for remaining capacity.
17
 Still, the Network Codes, elaborated by Agency for 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators, give a strong preference to auctions.  
In order to ensure an adequate investment pay-back, a new pipeline infrastructure can be subject to 
exemption from TPA requirements
18
. The rationale behind this is to grant pipeline constructors a 
certain time period so that their investments amortizes before allocating the capacity to potential 
competitors. Among others, TPA exemption has been still pending so far for the German onshore 
branch of Nord Stream pipeline OPAL
19
. Gazprom did not book pipeline capacity during the Open 
Season, a procedure required by European legislation. By contrast, Gazprom viewed long term supply 
agreements as automatically leading to capacity reservation. Eventually, Gazprom and the European 
Commission reached an agreement that would allocate 50% of the network capacity to Gazprom and 
earmark another 50% for auction. In the meantime South Stream, Gazprom’s major project rivaling 
EU sponsored pipelines in the Southern Corridor, had to comply with the afore-mentioned capacity 
                                                     
13
 See Articles 8, 11 and 12 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 984/2013 of 14 October 2013 establishing a Network Code 
on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms in Gas Transmission Systems and supplementing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, Official Journal of the European Union L 273/5 
14 
In this context, EU and Russia established a Gas Advisory Council, which aims at resolving the supply-capacity 
mismatch. Conclusions of the Gas Advisory Council (2013) on this issue are available on 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/dialogue/dialogue_en.htm (last accessed on 5 February 2015) 
15 
A. Konoplyanik, “A Common Russia-EU Energy Space (The New EU-Russia Partnership Agreement, Acquis 
Communautaire, the Energy Charter and the New Russian Initiative)” in K. Talus, P-L- Fratini, , EU-Russia Energy 
Relations,(Brussels: Euroconfidentiel, 2010) 
16 
See a more detailed comment on the European norms for Access to capacities and subsequent considerations by Russian 
experts by V. Feigin and A. Konoplyanik, Comments on Capacity Allocation on European Gas Transmission Networks 
Pilot Framework Guideline (Ref: E09-GNM-10-05, 10 December 2009) 
17 
A. Konoplyanik, presentation at „Energy Transitions“, Joensuu, 26 February 2015 
18 
For details see T. Van Der Vijver, “Commission Policy on Third Party Access Exemption for New Gas Infrastructure” in 
M. Roggenkamp and U. Hammer (eds), European Energy Law Report VI, Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 115-129 
19 
ICIS Newsletter, 30 October 2014, available on URL: 
http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2014/10/30/9833701/brandov-natural-gas-cross-border-capacity-in-demand-as-opal-
decision-delayed/ (last accessed on 4 February 2015) 
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mechanism because the consortium did not send a request for an exemption from third party access. 
Arguably a long pending decision on OPAL enhanced Gazprom’s distrust into the European 
exemption model and its operationalization. In addition, investors and financiers dislike the idea of 
exemption-based decisions as they generate uncertainty on long term frameworks: projects become 
dependent on bureaucratic decisions, which may increase transaction costs. The issue provoked 
controversy between Gazprom, the Commission and EU member countries hosting parts of the South 
Stream pipe, which eventually led to a cancellation of the project in December 2014. Throughout the 
controversy, Russia argued that intergovernmental agreements with the EU member states shall 
prevail over the EU law, hence the TPA would not be applicable.  
In aftermath of the South Stream cancellation, Gazprom proposed a new project via Turkey - 
Turkish Stream - which may imply a change in the company's strategy to access EU markets. The 
design of the new project, delivering gas to the Turkish-Greek border, would among other avoid TPA 
issues and Gazprom would decrease its participation in and exposure to the downstream sector
20
.  
Another area of dispute is related to investment into the European networks, and surrounds what has 
been nicknamed the “Gazprom clause”. At its very core, EU law permits restrictions for non-European 
suppliers to invest into EU energy networks. In addition, national regulatory authorities have a right to 
refuse the certification of non-European companies, in case there is an issue of supply security. The 
certification issue has so far not proven problematic for Gazprom. Still, the company considered itself 
targeted because the Directive's provision remains vague on the definition of “security”. 
Reacting on the 'Gazprom clause', Gazprom lobbied the Russian government to file a case against 
the EU at the World Trade Organization against the afore-mentioned investment restrictions. When 
making the case, Russia's argument will mainly center on discriminatory and anti-market practice 
pertaining to EU regulatory practices. 
In spite of the mounting competitive pressure on EU markets, Gazprom remained hesitant to 
change its contractual practices for capacity booking in Central and East European states, nor its 
incumbent business model. Consequently, the EU initiated an anti-trust monitoring procedure against 
Gazprom in 2012. With it, the European Commission addressed contractual practices of companies, 
mostly of Central and Eastern Europe, involving either Gazprom subsidiaries or close business 
partners. The European Commission objects three elements of Gazprom’s practices, which might run 
counter to EU law: market partitioning as a consequence of alleged de facto destination clauses, 
barriers to supply diversification through hoarding of pipeline capacity, and unfair pricing based an 
opaque oil indexation mechanisms
21
. Unlike in other cases, the European Commission addressed the 
issue of pricing
22
 which triggered criticism on behalf of Gazprom. In particular, Gazprom accused the 
European Commission of an attempt of an artificial control of prices
23
. Ironically, therefore Gazprom 
operates with similar arguments as the officials in Brussels, arguing for non-interference in market 
practices.  
In all, however, Gazprom's incumbent business model, based on LTCs and oil price indexation 
coupled with control over pipeline infrastructure has come under severe pressure. With the crisis in 
Ukraine unfolding, the European Commission decided to postpone the anti-trust monitoring. However, 
                                                     
20 
J. Stern, S. Pirani and K. Yafimava, Does the cancellation of South Stream signal a fundamental reorientation of Russian 
gas export policy?, Comment of Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, January 2015, available on URL: 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Does-cancellation-of-South-Stream-signal-a-
fundamental-reorientation-of-Russian-gas-export-policy-GPC-5.pdf (last accessed 5 February 2015). 
21
 N Sartori, The European Commission vs. Gazprom: An Issue of Fair Competition or a Foreign Policy Quarrel , IAI 
Working Papers 13 | 03 – January 2013, available on http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1303.pdf (last accessed on 4 
February 2015)  
22
 K. Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy Oxford: University Press, 2013 
23
 J. Stern, „Russian Responses to Commercial Changes in European Gas Markets“, J. Henderson and S. Pirani, The 
Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets are Driving Change, Oxford: University Press, 2014, pp. 50-81 
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the link between the two issues - Russia’s contractual practices in Eastern Europe and the Russia-
Ukraine gas dispute - remain weak. Hence, one can assume that legal implementation of the European 
law can indeed be subject to political compromises and accords. In the meantime, political uncertainty 
creates additional economic risk for both Gazprom and its European partners and creditors. 
Interestingly, European gas companies voice similar points of critique against EU competition policies 
in the sector, irrespective of their own disagreements with Gazprom on pricing and contracts.  
4. Ukraine crisis: further politicization of European gas trade 
A third element complicating Gazprom's operations in the European gas sector are the recurring 
disputes with the Ukraine, and in particular the most recent crisis that started in 2014. In short, the 
disputes spurred the politicization of Russian gas supplies. Arguably, when it comes to supply and 
pricing, Gazprom willingly became a political instrument in the Kremlin’s foreign policy. After a short 
supply cut to Ukraine during the 2006 gas crisis, the 2009 dispute, in which Gazprom decided to halt 
all gas supplies via Ukraine, strongly reinforced a negative image of Gazprom among European 
partners, and contributed to a growing perception of a politicization of EU-Russian gas trade. Clearly, 
this post-2009 environment was not taken into account by Gazprom officials later, when the conflict in 
Ukraine unfolded. Instead, similarly strong rhetoric toward Ukraine was utilised even by Gazprom’s 
top officials.  
Although the agreement of 2009 aimed at connecting the gas price to oil indexation, the new 
pricing arrangements did not align Ukrainian with EU border prices. Because of various discounts to 
European retailers, resulting from compromises over afore-mentioned disagreements, Gazprom’s 
estimated price to Ukraine has often been higher than the EU border price marker. Hence, the 
connection to international pricing remained vague in spite of the declaratory objective to introduce 
market mechanisms. 
Figure 5: Estimated gas price to Ukraine vs EU border price 
 
Source: Vedomosti, 28 July 2014 
Since the conflict of 2014, Gazprom has been trapped in the territorial dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine, which translate into a gas dispute. Its roots can be found in the Kharkov agreement of 2010. 
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At the time, then President Yanukovich obtained a $ 100 per tcm
24
 price reduction from Gazprom in 
return for the Black sea fleet being stationed in Crimea. However, in aftermath of Yanukovich being 
ousted of power in February 2014, Russia annexed the Peninsula and unilaterally revoked the Kharkov 
agreement. As argued by Moscow, since Crimea no longer is under Ukrainian sovereignty, the 
Kharkov agreement is nil. In turn, and as a consequence, the 2009 gas price of $ 450 was back in 
place. However, Ukraine disagrees with this interpretation and considers that Kharkov agreement as 
still valid. Therefore, Ukraine disputed the new gas price and refused to pay until an agreement on gas 
was found. Paradoxically, the new Ukrainian authorities defended the price agreement of late 2013, 
which had been concluded by their main adversary Yanukovich and stipulated $ 265 per tcm, as 
legitimate. Among others, Ukraine therefore reimbursed additional transit fees to Russia as they were 
not corresponding to the $265 per tcm gas price. As the transit fee is proportional to the price of the 
delivered volumes, Ukraine's calculation of transit fee results in a smaller amount compared to 
Gazprom's figure. This demonstrates how deeply the new tariff dispute is linked to the territorial 
dispute.  
Adding to this, a regulatory dimension in the shape of the EU energy regime come into play. Since 
2010, Ukraine has been a contracting party to the Energy Community Treaty, which aims at expanding 
the European energy market acquis to non-EU states. Such membership would therefore require the 
unbundling of Naftogas, the state owned Ukrainian national oil and gas company, and the creation of 
market-based anti-hoarding mechanisms for transit pipeline capacity. Distance-based tariffs for transit 
should then phase out and a new entry-exit method will be in place. Although these requirements were 
bound with difficulties when it came to implementation, they also constituted a barrier for a potential 
Gazprom-Naftogas consortium, which was lobbied for by Russia in 2011-13. Since 2014, and against 
the backdrop of a more pro-western political orientation of Ukraine, the implementation of the Treaty 
was accelerated. Ukraine now plans to introduce new entry-exit tariffs for pipeline capacity, which 
replace the existing distance-based tariff linked to Russian supplies. At the end of the day, Naftogaz' 
import monopoly is ought to be abolished and any Ukrainian trader will be allowed to import Russian 
gas. For Gazprom, the new system would mean selling gas at the Russia-Ukraine border instead of the 
EU border.  
In turn, a success of the planned Ukrainian gas hub will arguably not be functional with a strong 
dependence of Ukraine on Gazprom's supplies. Existing interconnections with other states have been 
built for transiting Russian gas to Europe and underground storages have been also filled with 
Gazprom's gas. Therefore, reverse gas flows, which were organized by Central European states to 
Ukraine, faced the issue of being reliant on one-directional infrastructure and full dependence on 
Gazprom's supplies. For instance, when Gazprom reduced gas supplies to European costumers in 
September 2014, this happened within contractual terms
25
; yet, the reduction was sufficient to make 
some countries (in particular Hungary) halt gas flows to Ukraine. Although the supplies from 
Hungary, Slovakia and Poland were often called “reverse flows”, they operated in different pipeline 
networks from Soviet-era inherited trunk pipelines. The desire of creating Ukrainian gas hub and 
connecting it to the Central European market may therefore hit the harsh realities of path dependencies 
in post-Soviet supply-transit structures.  
Finally, the Ukraine crisis has arguably been the tipping point in shifting Gazprom's export 
strategy, and has given rise to additional pipelines via the Black Sea - the above mentioned “Turkish 
Stream”. Gazprom's decision to re-route exports comes against the backdrop of an already existing 
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over-capacity in Russian export pipelines to Europe, which include the Ukrainian network, the Yamal-
Europe pipeline via Poland and Nord Stream. This merits the question how of over-capacities of 
networks compare to gas export volumes. The pipeline network via Ukraine amounts to almost 150 
bcm of annual capacity, which adds to 33 bcm of Yamal-Europe (via Poland), 55 bcm of Nord Stream 
to Germany (through the Baltic Sea) and finally 15 bcm of Blue Stream to Turkey (through the Black 
Sea). With Turkish Stream projected to 63 bcm per annum, Russian export capacities will almost 
double compared to the exceptional peak in exports of 2013. Since there hardly is an economic 
rationale for this move, it is arguably the Ukraine nexus that drives Gazprom's new strategy. Finding 
alternatives to Russia-Ukraine route is primarily of interest of south-eastern Europe, a region which 
still suffers from lopsided infrastructure options. Also, contrary to official statements, Ukraine cannot 
be entirely circumvented as most of Gazprom’s LTCs stipulate delivery points in Central Europe and 
hence necessitate the use of the Ukrainian network at least until current LTCs expire in 2030-35. This 
comes against the backdrop of Ukraine’s strong dependence on Gazprom. All of this suggests that 
both Russia and Ukraine would find it difficult to significantly reduce their mutual exposure in the 
energy sector in the next years to come.  
5. Domestic Russian market: pressure from within 
A final challenge for Gazprom emerges on its home market. In fact, and counter to widespread 
perception, the market paradigm is nothing new to the Russian gas sector. Already in 2002, the 
Ministry of Economy tabled a number of reform proposals aimed at restructuring Gazprom. Although 
Gazprom managed to resist fundamental change, it has now become subject to market regulation, 
including provisions on non-discriminatory access to pipelines for independent gas producers
26
. 
However, Gazprom controls all the trunk pipelines and typically feeds gas from non-Gazprom sources 
into its networks only after having purchased it. Yet, third party access to pipelines has been especially 
promoted by Russia's Federal Anti-Monopoly Service. Over the past years, independent Russian gas 
producers therefore started to gain access to networks without losing the ownership over the 
commodity they were feeding into the grid. In addition, the gas flaring reduction plan of 2009 
incentivized oil companies to entered the gas condensate market. Consequently, Gazprom's share in 
Russian natural gas production declined from almost 95% in early the 2000s to less than 80% in 2014. 
This share keeps on declining since. This trend coincides with the rise of Novatek, a gas company that 
emerged in the late 1990s and whose owner, Gennady Timchenko, allegedly has built strong ties with 
the Kremlin. In addition Rosneft, the second major state owned energy company, increased its gas 
stakes, especially since the acquisition of assets owned by Anglo-Russian company TNK-BP in 2011. 
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Figure 6: Structure and dynamics of Russia's gas production 
 
Source: TEK, Russia’s Gas Statistics, 2014 
Subsequently, the creation of a wholesale Russian gas market gained a political support at the 
governmental level. Already in 2006-08, a market platform was set to trade gas between Gazprom and 
independent gas producers. However, trade activities calmed down with the wake of the financial 
downturn of 2009, and Russia's government brought back the idea only in 2010. Eventually, a new 
wholesale market platform is in operation since October 2014, albeit with so far limited volumes and 
churn
27
. Experts observe only limited interest in the market platform on part of Gazprom
28
. Moreover, 
for most of Russian domestic gas consumption tariff and price regulation remains in place
29
; however, 
governmental plans to introduce market pricing are being discussed. In all, therefore, there has been 
growing competition between various gas companies, particularly for customers in the Russian power 
sector
30
. Gazprom's main fear consists in losing the most profitable stakes in Russia's power market. 
Therefore, Gazprom already acquired about 16% of generation capacity in the country. However, 
competition with Novatek is becoming more fierce for the electricity market.  
Gazprom’s challenge in both domestic and export markets consists in the amounting over-
investment. As discussed, it is especially export pipelines to Europe that exceed supplies sent west 
going forward. Turkish Stream complicates the situation even further, and the new pipeline might still 
face similar challenges related to declining European gas demand and third party access requirements 
once the pipeline crosses the territory of the Energy Community space. 
Domestic changes also affect external regulation. Both Novatek and Rosneft lobbied for repealing 
Gazprom's export monopoly in LNG, an effort that was successful and signed into law in December 
2013. However, the access to domestic trunk pipelines remains under Gazprom control. Rosneft 
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therefore requested access to Gazprom’s pipelines to connect its planned LNG facility (operated 
jointly by Rosneft and ExxonMobil) in Sakhalin to the transit network. Interestingly, Russia’s Federal 
Antimonopoly Service made Gazprom comply with provisions on non-discriminatory access to its 
pipelines, which Gazprom wanted to defend in front of courts.
31
 Gazprom therefore faces a ironic 
situation in which another state-owned company, Rosneft, challenges its positions, and in which two 
state owned companies compete for domestic market shares. There is an interesting twist, Rosneft’s 
leadership, which represents the most conservative and statist wing of Russia’s elite, openly uses 
competition arguments to fight Gazprom, similar to those presented by the European Commission. 
Adding insult to injury, Novatek managed to conclude a 10-year contract of 2 bcm of annual gas 
deliveries to Germany.
32
 Precisely because this violates Russia's long-standing practice of Gazprom 
maintaining an export monopoly, this move confirms the general trend that the gas giant is about to 
lose is overly dominant position both on the domestic market and in external trade.  
Gazprom's response to the situation consisted once again in over-investment. Among other, 
Gazprom initiated two LNG terminal projects, one in Vladivostok and one in Baltics, both located far 
from resource-base and both requiring additional investments into trunk pipelines. 
6. Assessing Gazprom's options 
Overall, Gazprom faces challenges related to its traditional business model on the European market, 
notably because of the European regulatory model and an increasing politicization of gas trade. 
Adding to that, Gazprom faces mounting pressures domestically, both regarding market share as with 
a view to its fading export monopoly. Squeezed between a rock and a hard place, what are Gazprom's 
options? Here, we present a critical assessment of existing strategies and will carve out possible policy 
options.  
6.1 Diversify customer base: the China pivot 
A first option for Gazprom consists in divesting from a lopsided dependence on the European export 
market, and turn to Asia. This would diversify its customer base and the company could build on its 
existing strength in the upstream and export segments. A structural argument backing this strategy 
consists in the fast growing Asian gas demand which contrasts with a slowly declining share of gas in 
Europe. In fact, since the mid-2000s Russia’s Gazprom and China’s CNPC had been negotiating the 
possibility of a gas pipeline from Siberia to China
33
. Apparently, however, negotiations were stuck due 
to disagreements over the price. Although the details remained confidential, Gazprom allegedly aimed 
for a European price level, which China was not ready to agree on. It was only in early 2011 that 
China and Russia came to an agreement on the political level, leaving details to be agreed by the gas 
operators. Russia declared to be ready to supply up to 60 bcm (slightly more than a third of exports to 
the EU) to China.  
Still, it was only in the wake of the Ukraine crisis that Russia's Eastern strategy gained momentum. 
In May 2014 Russia and China agreed on gas trade of 32 bcm annually from 2018 onwards. The 
agreement provides a political ground for a long term orientation of Russian supplies to the world 
fastest growing energy demand state. Many pointed out a difficult task in implementing the project as 
new pipeline infrastructure must be built to China. For instance, capital costs for exploration in 
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Yakutia, from where gas supplies to China will be provided, are estimated at $ 70 billion in capital 
costs only. This should be complemented with transportation costs and operational costs
34
. Hence, the 
economic gain for Gazprom might be questionable. Gazprom expected to receive a pre-payment from 
China for building the necessary new pipeline infrastructure. In turn, China considered the pre-
payment a loan and hence demanded interest on it. As the agreement on financing the pipeline 
remained pending, Gazprom started the project with own capital expenditure. 
Later on, another pipeline direction from west Siberia to western part of China (so-called western 
route) was discussed for another 30 bcm of gas supplies. In this case, Russia-China agreement aims at 
a long term increase of volumes from Russia to China, which would deviate parts of the gas 
designated to Germany. However, up to now, parties did not agree on the exact terms for the “western 
route” to China.  
Yet, China plays hard to catch and might need smaller volumes from Russia. China’s incremental 
gas demand by 2020 is expected to be about 120 bcm, and China has increased its commitments for 
LNG imports from the Asia-Pacific and tightens ties with Turkmenistan. For instance, in May 2014, 
right before the deal with Russia, China concluded an agreement with Turkmenistan to supply 62 bcm 
of gas from 2016 onwards, two years earlier than Russia. That way, Beijing indirectly demonstrated to 
Moscow that it does not vitally need Russian gas, whereas Russia would more urgently need to 
diversify supplies away from Europe. Furthermore, it is not necessarily Gazprom that will emerge the 
winner in Russia's efforts to pivot to China. In fact, Gazprom pivoting to Asia triggered new 
competition between Gazprom and Russia's independent gas producers. Among other, Russia’s 
government agreed to co-finance new pipeline projects from East Siberia to Russia. This would imply 
that Gazprom might eventually lose its export monopoly toward Asia to independent producers. This 
would certainly fall in line with the more general pro-competition trend in Russia’s domestic 
regulation.  
China its, finally, a country that still prefers long term bilateral agreements, became a market 
changer for Russian gas. For China, bilateral agreements remain the more secure option compared to a 
volatile oil-indexed Japanese gas market, at least for the time being. In this context, Gazprom might 
need to improve domestic efficiency of investments and might hence reconsider its investment 
commitments. For instance, the Vladivostok LNG terminal will be located remotely from the resource 
base and hence would require additional investments into trunk pipelines. This may become tricky 
against the backdrop of alternative pipelines being constructed into China and tightening competition 
for China’s market.35 Japanese import prices declining by nearly 50% in the last months may also put 
in question the expansion of LNG facilities in Sakhalin, which are jointly operated with Shell. For the 
same reason, Gazprom might not need to fear Rosneft's desire to acquire a market share in Japan with 
its own project in Sakhalin. At the same time, it is highly likely that Rosneft and Novatek will demand 
access to Eastern pipeline infrastructure. Hence, Gazprom would feel pressure from both domestic and 
international competitors willing to access China’s markets.  
6.2 Fight fire with fire: resort to international law 
A second option for Gazprom is to take on the legal challenge on its European market. In fact, despite 
deteriorating political relations, a number of contractual controversies with European companies and 
states have recently been resolved via various arbitration procedures and pre-arbitration compromises. 
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Compromises have been struck between Gazprom and European companies particularly with a view to 
implementing more flexible contractual commitments for gas supplies and pricing. Gazprom's most 
complex dispute was with Lithuania, involving a long range of issues, from Vilnius' decision to sell 
Gazprom's network assets in order to implement the third energy package to even covering gas transit 
to Russia's enclave of Kaliningrad. Disputes were successfully resolved within arbitration and 
Gazprom agreed on selling its assets in transport networks in the Baltic country. In the meantime, 
transit of Russia's gas to Kaliningrad has been secured so far and operates with a significant over-
capacity in networks from Lithuania to Kaliningrad. Hence, Gazprom never faced a capacity-supply 
problem in the region.  
Still, the “Gazprom clause” and the full ownership unbundling remain important barriers for 
Gazprom's economic activities in Europe. As indicated, in an attempt to defend its cause in Europe, 
Gazprom made the Russian government file a case against EU investment restrictions in front of the 
WTO. That way, Gazprom, as a major international company, is using international legal mechanisms 
to protect its positions outside its home country. Choosing WTO procedures arguably is only second 
best compared to operating on the basis of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). For instance, the Energy 
Charter investment provisions could have been used in defending Gazprom's investments in Europe.
36
 
The WTO does not entail a similar investment protection regime. Instead, direct state-investor dispute 
settlements have usually been covered by either Bilateral Investment Treaties or (for energy) the ECT. 
Yet, Russia does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty with Estonia, a country which also 
implemented full ownership unbundling. In this case, the Energy Charter could have been a valid 
framework for Gazprom in its potential arbitral case with Estonia. Yet, since the Kremlin rejected the 
ratification of the ECT in 2009
37
, its instruments might not be available to Gazprom. The company is 
now forced to look for more indirect ways of access to arbitration. It is important to note that although 
Gazprom could have been benefited from the multilateral energy treaty, Russia's rapprochement with 
the Energy Charter is highly unlikely, especially with a view to the Yukos case.
38
 The approach 
towards the WTO has been different so far, although Gazprom can participate only indirectly by 
lobbying through the Russian government. Though time-consuming, litigation will still require 
significant efforts before any decision will take place.  
6.3 Adaptation to Markets: give in to new realities 
A third option for Gazprom consists in adapting to new regulatory realities on European markets, in 
order to keep its long term market position. In fact, Gazprom has made steps toward accommodating 
requests by its European customers. For instance, Gazprom agreed to amend existing contracts with 
Eni, Eon and other European utilities to include hub-based pricing elements. Adapting to market 
realities would also allow reducing over-investments.  
Yet, although Gazprom seems to be flexible in finding compromises with European companies, it 
remains reluctant to comply with the EU’s regulatory environment. Compared to adjustment through 
arbitration, which is on firm level and allows Gazprom to maintain its interests, adjustment to EU rules 
would amount to a fundamental change in the company's business model. Making matters worse, 
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formal attempts to consult with the Commission started only in 2011, two years after the Third Energy 
Package was put in place. This drives the point home that Gazprom often under-estimated the EU’s 
legal and procedural requirements, as well as its intent to enforce them (as became apparent in the 
cases of OPAL and South Stream). Gazprom's contracts in Central and Eastern Europe also remain 
opaque and politically shaped, which spells conflict with EU regulators and the European 
Commission. Anti-hoarding mechanisms for the pipeline contracts, finally, might gradually expand to 
Central and Eastern European as well as Ukrainian networks. 
In this context it is important to appreciate that Gazprom's gas supplies will remain crucial for 
European markets in the long term, for the sheer lack of economically viable alternative supply 
options.
39
 Gazprom might therefore be able to convince the EU to adopt a certain degree of regulatory 
flexibility to facilitate Russian gas imports. The issue of supply-capacity mismatch, for instance, 
should certainly be discussed within various policy, expert and industry frameworks. Also, Gazprom's 
infrastructures has been mostly amortised which gives Gazprom an opportunity to keep on granting 
select price discounts. Lithuania's recent construction of an LNG terminal, for instance, which comes 
with a purchase contract with Statoil, presents a challenge for Gazprom's positions in the tiny Baltic 
market. However, Gazprom remains in a position to exert price leverage. By the end of 2014, 
Gazprom allocated a price discount to Lithuania's gas company, which makes Russian gas about 10% 
cheaper than Statoil's LNG cargos. All of this suggests that Gazprom may have opportunities in 
adapting to new market realities. 
6.4 Depoliticize the business model: create long term expectations on European market 
A fourth option for Gazprom will be to work toward depoliticising gas sales in Europe. This may 
prove difficult but may in the long term work toward Gazprom's favor. Presently, against the backdrop 
of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, the European Commission decided to postpone the pending anti-trust 
monitoring against Gazprom. What is more, the EU-Russian Gas Advisory Council, established in 
order to tackle key issues of concern on both sides, has been inactive, as no major political decision 
might to be taken during the crisis. Further, the EU presently seems to adopt an approach of 'non-
decision' towards Gazprom: neither do they move forward on anti-trust monitoring nor are there steps 
toward solving issues surrounding the supply-capacity mismatch. This keeps Gazprom in a limbo, and 
the persisting political uncertainty creates an additional economic risk for Gazprom. Finally, 
sensitivity levels in Europe toward Gazprom are high. Disputes over gas supplies to and transit 
through Ukraine is likely to further deteriorate Gazprom’s image in Europe, which might translate into 
further choices in the spheres of regulatory policy and when it comes to negotiating future supply 
contracts. This may impact on Gazprom's long term position on its most profitable market. Therefore, 
and regardless of European concerns centering on supply security, the increasing politicization of gas 
supplies clearly also plays against Gazprom.  
Depoliticizing gas trade would require two main elements. First, Gazprom would need to give up 
on its export monopoly. Arguably, Russian oil exports, which are entirely demonopolized, are not 
considered a security issue in Europe. By contrast, Gazprom's dominant position on the European 
market supports European perceptions of the company as the Kremlin's foreign policy arm. 
Demonopolizing gas exports would come with various advantages: It would balance out current over-
capacity in Russian export pipelines to Europe and growing domestic production capacity from non-
Gazprom producers; resulting competition would push Gazprom, the incumbent, to take strategic 
choices on new projects and increase the company's overall efficiency; and it may even stabilize its 
European market share, as the historical case of Statoil suggests. Indeed, the demonopolization of 
Statoil’s exports was accompanied by an increase of the market share of Norway in Europe. 
                                                     
39 
See Andreas Goldthau, Can Europe survive without Russian gas? Maybe, but it should not have to. GMF Policy Brief, 
2015 (forthcoming). 
Andrei V. Belyi and Andreas Goldthau 
16 
Admittedly, abandoning the de jure export monopoly - despite the challenge that Novatek et al present 
- remains politically sensitive in Moscow, and Gazprom enjoys persistently strong political support. 
However, demonopolization would arguably strengthen Gazprom’s hand in the long run. Existing 
flows, which constitute the basis for Gazprom's LTCs, could continue to receive priority access to 
Russia's export networks under the right of first refusal principle. New supply contracts, concluded by 
either Gazprom or its competitors Novatek and Rosneft would get their share in exports to Europe and 
hence increase liquidity and competition on European hubs. As old contracts will phase out over time, 
new gas flows will gradually dominate exports, as does a new export regime. Such a move would not 
only fall in line with EU regulation but also decrease political tension and reduce the politicization of 
Russian gas exports. In fact, it is not inconceivable that Gazprom agreeing to forego its export 
monopoly could become a bargaining chip in the context of the European Commission's anti-trust case 
against the company. 
The second element would consist in the Europeans acting quid pro quo and adopting appropriate 
steps on their part. This not only includes consultations on the discussed supply-capacity mismatch, 
which is important not only for Gazprom but also for the European gas industry. Such a move would 
allow the EU to maintain its liberal paradigm in energy policy. This paradigm has increasingly come 
under pressure due to an ongoing securitization of gas supplies, in the context of discussions on 
common purchase vehicles, and because internal market integration was lagging. It should be noted 
that a constructive relation between the EU and Russian gas suppliers would contribute to creating a 
competitive gas market. In this context, the needs of investors, especially regarding new trunk pipeline 
infrastructure, have to be taken into account to reflect market realities.  
7. Conclusion: Gazprom weathering the perfect storm? 
Gazprom has options, but they require tough choices. At present, however, Gazprom's strategy appears 
inconclusive. On one hand, recent moves taken by Gazprom's leadership suggest that the company is 
committed to fostering the China pivot, despite the presently poor economic fundamentals of this 
'Eastern Strategy'. Yet, the China pivot hardly amounts to a strategy nor does it necessarily solve 
Gazprom's problems, which consist in a soft international market environment, rising competition 
domestically and abroad, and an increasing politicization of gas trade in its still most important export 
market. Re-routing EU supplies through Turkey, on the other hand, point to a re-orientation of 
Gazprom's export strategies, as a reaction to the ongoing conflict in the Ukraine, past transit disputes 
with the country, and EU policies effectively stopping South Stream. Statements have also been made 
to the effect that the company would completely withdraw from the European downstream market. All 
of this suggests that Gazprom aims at diversifying away from the EU market and the regulatory 
regime governing the European gas sector. Gazprom seems confident to keep the current EU market 
share.  
To be sure, pivoting to Asia and defending market share in Europe are not mutually exclusive 
strategies, and can be the result of diversification efforts coupled with measures toward higher 
compliance with EU regulatory frameworks. Yet, arguably, this is not what Gazprom pursues. To the 
contrary, Gazprom's strategy is very much driven by concurrent and contradictory dynamics within the 
company. Parts of the company that represent post-ministerial structures still regard Gazprom as a tool 
for Russian (external) power. Related political discourses clearly stem from Gazprom's historical 
legacies, even though these discourses more often than not mismatch reality. At the same time, 
Gazprom's participation in hubs, compromises on contracts and prices and attempts to use 
international legal instruments for dispute settlements demonstrate that parts of the leadership are 
willing to de-politicize the gas business. These two contradicting approaches at times become even 
evident inside Gazprom’s affiliates. 
It remains to be seen which camp within Gazprom ultimately retains the upper hand. Among all 
options outlined above, Gazprom should aim at de-politicizing gas trade by way of de-monopolizing 
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exports. While the company would see growing competition from domestic competitors Rosneft and 
Novatek it would in turn see the support of the European Commission in liberalizing export regimes 
and in fostering gas-on-gas competition. Such a move would arguably also soften the EU's attempts to 
put additional political, economic and monetary resources behind checking Russian market power - 
notably in the shape of the planned 'Energy Union'.  
Such an adaptation process would not necessarily imply that the company foregoes its interests. 
Although Gazprom will have hard times 'fighting fire with fire' it will still be able to use legal 
instruments for defending its rights and interests in Europe. The challenge will be to keep disputes in 
the legal sphere and at lower levels of politicization. Here, Gazprom will find support in Europe. 
Clearly, Europe has not gained from the politicization of gas trade. A negative effect of the 
securitization of international energy governance has been, for instance, Russia's rejection of the 
Energy Charter Treaty, which the EU has pushed for two decades. This has arguably decreased 
predictability and planning security in international energy relations. And, in spite of differences on 
prices (which become again less relevant in the context of lower oil price), both the European gas 
industry and banking sector have an interest in Gazprom weathering the perfect storm.  
For European regulators it might be worth considering infrastructure regulation, a concern voiced 
not only bay Gazprom but also the European energy industry. New pipelines entail long lead times, 
require a stable investment climate and will hardly be built based on a traditional pro-market regime 
coupled with rather arbitrary exemptions. Closer consultations between European regulators and the 
energy industry, including Gazprom, would help to depoliticize the context. 
Still, it is mainly on Gazprom to take the right steps. Short of that, new spirals of gas trade 
politicization are likely to make security agendas dominate over the market logic, both in Europe and 
Russia. The result would be further demand destruction in Europe and even more unclear export 
prospects for Gazprom. It is on Gazprom to make the right choice. 
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